INTRODUCTION
With just a day to the Kenyan general elections
and the election fever widespread, individuals are beside themselves as to what
will happen; the aftermath of the 2013 general elections. The international
community is also concerned for the welfare of Kenyans. This is clearly illustrated
by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) efforts to ensure that justice
takes its course and the perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election violence
pay for their crimes (if the said crimes will ever be confirmed) and all the
victims gain a feeling of justice having prevailed.
Human rights advocates are also worried that the
country could explode into violence during the next general elections (Washington Times, 1 March, 2011). They
are thus proposing that the Kenyan government puts up measures that will ensure
that post-election violence does not recur and thus remains embedded in pages
of historical books. This was clearly illustrated by George Morara; Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) researcher who stated thus: “Our concern is that, should the government
not implement these reforms, the 2007-08 violence will seem like a “Christmas
party” compared to the violence in 2012.” (Washington Times, 1 March, 2011; http://www.washingtontimes.com)
Peter Karanja, leader of the National Council of
Churches in Kenya (NCCK), also raised his suspicions on the fact that efforts
had not been made to demobilize youth groups and militias recruited to carry
out the violence between December 2007 and February 2008. He stated thus: “The failure to do this three years after the
violence raises suspicions that there are plans to engage those groups in
similar violence in the future.” (Washington
Times, 1 March, 2011; http://www.washingtontimes.com)
The apprehension towards the 4 March 2013
general elections should not be overlooked or viewed simply as another ‘scare’
on individuals. This is due to the fact that the 2007/2008 post election
violence was a reality and not simply a fairy tale or propaganda as it left
more than 1,500 people dead, about 3,500 injured and up to 600,000 forcibly
displaced. There were also hundreds of rapes and a significant number of
property destroyed (over 100, 000).
The 2007/2008 post election violence has been
termed the worst humanitarian crisis since Kenya’s independence.
(www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?indepthid=68)
Although Kenya has experienced post-election
violence in the past; in 1992, 1997 and 2007; a situation that has also been
experienced in other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Togo, Ivory Coast,
Nigeria and Uganda among others, this should not be taken as a determinant of
the outcome of the 2013 general election.
Investigating the causes of the 2007/2008 election violence
would be a realistic strategy because post-election violence threatens an individual's
right to vote, which is valued as an opportunity to affect the outcome of
specific elections (www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php).
This in essence hinders public participation in national issues as individuals
will be apprehensive about voting since they will always associate voting with
violence. Secondly, post-election violence may undermine the legitimacy of
governments that base their claims to constitutional authority on election
outcomes.
The
question should thus be: what can be done to ensure that post-election violence
does not recur as Failure to act could lead to an uncontrollable situation
similar to that in Somalia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Sudan.
Preliminary
Although conflict is often viewed as
negative, the National School Board Association in their Toolkit for
Educational Leadership (http://www.nsba.org/sbot/toolkit/Conflict.html)
states that conflict can be both positive and negative. In their view, conflict
is negative when it takes attention away from other activities, damages the
spirit of the team or an individual, divides individuals and groups making
cooperation difficult or makes individuals or groups focus on their differences
thereby resulting in harmful behavior like fighting or name-calling.
Conflict can however be positive or
constructive when it clears up important problems or issues, brings about
solutions to problems, gets everyone involved in solving issues, results in
real communication, releases emotions, anxiety and stress in a positive way,
helps people learn more about each other and co-operate and develops
understanding and skills
(downloads.cas.psu.edu/leadership/pdf/conflictmanagement.pdf). This
‘philosophy’ can be applied partly to the Kenyan situation as the 2007/2008
post election violence was more of a negative than a positive affair as it did
not yield any good.
According to the Foundation Coalition:
Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management (www.foundationcoalition.org/publications/brochures/conflict.pdf),
individuals psychologically respond to conflict in one of two ways — they want
to “get away from the conflict” or are ready to “take on anyone who comes their
way.” This phenomenon could be used to understand the reactions of Kenyans who
fought for what they believed in when the disputed election results were
released on December 30 2007.
Those who supported the then opposition
leader Raila Odinga alleged that the election results were due to rampant
rigging countrywide and thus opted for violence, attacking members of the
opposition (President Mwai Kibaki’s supporters and his supposed ‘clansmen’) and
vice versa. That is, Kenyans decided to take on those who were in their way
rather than get away from the conflict, solve it amicably or ignore it all
together.
TIMELINE
OF THE 2007/2008 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE
www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-violence.html
and the United Nations Human rights team
(blog.ushahidi.com/2008/03/20/report-on-post-election-violence-in-kenya-un-human-rights-team/)
outline in detail the events as they occurred from the 2007 general elections
to the final negotiations and eventual signing of the peace deal that took the
country on a healing path. The post election violence started immediately after
the 2007 election results were announced by the Chairman of the Electoral
Commission of Kenya (ECK), the late Samuel Kivuitu.
27 December 2007
The Kenyan presidential and parliamentary
elections took place after over a year of campaigning.
30
December 2007- 20 January 2008
After initial results proclaimed that Hon. Raila
Odinga was leading in votes; President Mwai Kibaki was suddenly declared the
election winner and promptly sworn in for his second term as the Kenyan president
on the evening of the same day (30 December 2007). Following the election
results of the hotly-contested presidential election, opposition leader Raila
Odinga and his supporters rejected the declared victory of Mwai Kibaki,
alleging it was the result of rampant rigging.
Protests degenerated into widespread violence as
decades of economic frustration and ethnic rivalry spiraled out of control. In
the days immediately after the results were announced, gangs of youth blocked
Kenya’s main roads and set fire to the homes of perceived ‘outsiders’. This
occurred mainly in Kisumu and Nairobi slums.
The second phase consisted of organized attacks
in the Rift Valley which targeted non-Kalenjin
communities and those perceived as opponents of the Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM) party, including the Kikuyu, Kisii
and Luyha communities. In
retaliation, gangs of Kikuyu youth
subsequently attacked non-Kikuyu
groups in Naivasha, Nakuru and Mathare. In all, more than 1,200 people were
killed and about 350,000 displaced into temporary camps, with an equal number
seeking refuge with friends or relatives. Around 42,000 houses and many
businesses were looted and/or destroyed. A significant number of cases of
sexual violence were also reported.
Agricultural activity was seriously hampered as
farmers moved away from their fields, posing long-terms risks for the country’s
food security – already threatened by drought and soaring fertilizer prices.
The education and health sectors were also compromised by the large-scale displacement
of professionals. On January 1, 2008, a church in Kiambaa was burnt with more
than 100 people inside.
The international community responded to the
situation with a clear view that the strategic position held by Kenya both in
the region and in the continent could not be allowed to drown.
After meeting Jendayi Frazer the United States
Assistant Secretary of State on January 5, 2008, President Mwai Kibaki said
that he was willing to form a national unity government. Hon. Raila Odinga (who
also met with Jendayi Frazer) however rejected this, saying that President Mwai
Kibaki "should not come to the negotiating table as the president"
and called for the creation of a transitional government that would lead to new
elections within three to six months.
Hon. Raila Odinga however met with Jendayi
Frazer for a second time and shortly afterwards, his spokesman said that the
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) would no longer demand for President Mwai
Kibaki’s resignation provided that he accepted an international mediator.
On January 6, Hon. RailaOdinga called for
rallies to be held on January 8, despite the government's insistence that the
rallies would be illegal. He subsequently cancelled the rallies saying that the
mediation process, facilitated by Ghanaian President and African Union Chairman
John Kufuor, were about to begin, with Kibaki having officially invited Kufuor,
and that negotiation needed to take place in a peaceful atmosphere.
On January 9, Mr. Kufuor met separately with
President Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila Odinga. The talks however failed to bear
any fruit when President Mwai Kibaki allegedly refused to sign an agreement
presented to him by Kufuor. Kufuor left Kenya on January 10, saying that both
parties had agreed to continue talks together with former United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and a panel of eminent African personalities.
The Orange Democratic Movement planned protests,
intended to last for three days; from 16-19 January 2008. Police met the
protests with force and prevented them from reaching Uhuru Park in Nairobi.
Protests also took place in other parts of the country, including Kisumu and
Eldoret. At least two people were reported killed in Kisumu as police used live
ammunition against the protesters. On January 19, despite the Orange Democratic
Movement's earlier announcement that it would cease protests, it said that
protests would resume on January 24.
22-23
January 2008
Former United Nation Secretary General Kofi
Annan arrived in Kenya on 22 Janaury 2008. On January 23, the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) held a memorial service in Nairobi for victims of the
post-election violence. On the same day, President Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila
Odinga met separately with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. An agreement was
reached in principle to establish a judicial commission that would investigate
the accusations of vote rigging. Kofi Annan also met with Hon. Raila Odinga who
agreed to cancel the protests set for the next day.
24 January 2008
The first talks between President Mwai Kibaki
and Hon Raila Odinga occurred, initiated by former United Nations secretary
Kofi Annan.
28 - 31 January 2008
Member of Parliament Mellitus Were, of the
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party was murdered outside his house in
Nairobi as more violence erupted in the country. David Kimutai Too of ODM was
also murdered in Rift Valley province on 31 January 2008.
Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reported progress on the talks between President Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila Odinga with the government lifting the ban on peaceful political rallies.
15 February 2008
Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reports on the agreement on electoral law reforms and other legislations.
28 February 2008
President Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila Odinga sign a peace agreement which stipulated that the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) were to form a coalition government with Mwai Kibaki as the president and Hon. Raila Odinga in the newly created office of the prime minister.
The power-sharing Cabinet, headed by Hon. Raila Odinga as the Prime Minister and Mwai KIbaki as the president was eventually named on April 13 2008, after lengthy negotiations over its composition and was sworn in on April 17 2008.
THE COURSE
OF JUSTICE
The Waki commission released its findings
and recommendations on the 2007/2008 post election violence. The recommendations
clearly specified the deadline for the formation of a local Tribunal in Kenya,
with an alternative option in the case that a local Tribunal failed to be
established. The former United Nations Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan
extended the deadline thrice while the former International Criminal Court
(ICC) prosecutor Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo extended it for the fourth time
(http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/58424).
Despite the extended time to form a local
tribunal to try the perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post election violence, the
Kenyan government failed to form the tribunal. Perhaps they thought that it was
just another scare by the International Community and/or a publicity stunt by
the former International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Mr. Luis
Moreno-Ocampo.
Failure to set up a local tribunal to try
the perpetrators of the post-election violence made Mr.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo take the cases to the
International Criminal Court. When he (Mr. Ocampo) presented the case against
the six perpetrators at the International Criminal Court on 15 December 2010 he
stated thus; “these were not just crimes
against innocent Kenyans, they were crimes against humanity as a whole. By
breaking the cycle of impunity for massive crimes, victims and their families
can have justice and Kenyans can pave the way to peaceful elections in 2012”
(http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2010)/pr615)
Mr. Ocampo further requested the
International Criminal Court to issue summons to the six Kenyan Citizens
namely; Deputy Prime minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, ODM chairman
Henry Kosgey, former Education minister William Ruto, former commissioner of
police Major General Mohammed Hussein Ali, Head of Civil Service Francis
Muthaura and Kass FM journalist Joshua Arap Sang to appear in court to answer
for crimes committed against humanity during the post-election violence. Mr.
Moreno-Ocampo stated that, “the six cited
are the most responsible, but of course there are many others... We concentrate
on the most responsible...of course; Kenya can decide to prosecute more.” (www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php)
The Kenyan government attempted to appeal
to the International Criminal Court that the Truth Justice and Reconciliation
Commission (TJRC) try the perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
The appeal was however rejected by the International Criminal Court. (The BBC,
30 August, 2011)
The Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable
grounds to believe that each of the perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election
violence had a case to answer according to article 25(3) (a) of the Rome
Statute for crimes against humanity (www.icc-cpi.int).
Henry Kosgey, William Ruto and Joshua Arap
Sang were summoned to appear at the International Criminal Court on 8 March
2011 with the initial appearance hearings on 7 April 2011 and the confirmation
of charges hearing scheduled for 1 September 2011 while their counterparts
Francis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali were summoned to
appear at the International Criminal Court on 8 March 2011 with their initial
appearance hearings on 8 April 2011 and the confirmation of charges hearing
scheduled for 21 September 2011 (www.icc-cpi.int).
The court
proceedings
The International Criminal Court allowed
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to hide the identity of his key witnesses from
the defence teams of the six suspects when he disclosed evidence he intended to
use at their confirmation hearings. This decision was disputed by Head of Civil
Service Mr. Francis Muthaura on claims that new evidence by a witness
comprising a video interview establishes "strong grounds to believe that
persons who may be prosecution witnesses at the confirmation hearing may have
committed an offence under Article 70 of the Statute." The Article
outlines offences against the administration of justice which include giving
false testimony, presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged
and corruptly influencing a witness. (The Standard, Friday, September, 16,
2011).
He further petitioned ICC judges to sanction an impartial investigation into what he alleged was dubious testimony, citing conflict of interest because Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo intended to rely on the witnesses’ evidence to have the charges confirmed. (The Standard, Friday, September, 16, 2011). Most of the suspects accuse the ICC prosecutor Mr. Moreno Ocampo of relying on anonymous witnesses to implicate them in the post-election violence. Durind the confirmation of hearing charges, suspended minister Henry Kosgey asked to be heard in camera five times in three hours terming the prosecuter’s witness number 6 as unreliable (The Daily Nation, 6 September 2011). His counterpart Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta also made a decision to be his own witness, a decision termed as risky by his lawyer.
CAUSES OF THE 2007/2008 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE
Understanding what caused the 2007/2008 post-election violence will in essence help prevent future instances of violence on the basis of elections. The 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya was mainly attributed to election fraud. This allegation is however not entirely true as there might have been more underlying issues of greater magnitude that could have caused the 2007/2008 post election violence.
Political analysts have tried to come up
with different explanations for the post-election violence in Kenya
(www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com/.../minimum-requ). The Independent
Review Commission (IREC) also released their findings (in their report) on the
causes of the 2007/2008 post-election violence (www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf). They include:
Laxity to
punish perpetrators of earlier political violence
The perpetrators of the 1992 and 1997
post-election violence failed to pay for their crimes. They simply went scot
free. This fact is the main reason that there was a repeat of the post election
violence in 2007. The Kenyan government also assumed that in the case that
violence occurred, it would not be critical since the 1992 and the 1997
election violence was also not serious.
Electoral
fraud and political differences
The 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya is
attributed to popular frustration with the outcome of the 2007 general election
(www.africanexecutive.com/modules/.../articles.php).
Immediately after President Mwai Kibaki was
declared the winner of the 2007 general election, the Orange Democratic
Movement party members namely Hon. Raila Odinga and his supporters rejected the
declared victory of Mwai Kibaki, alleging it was the result of rampant rigging.
Violence erupted thereafter in the hopes that President Mwai Kibaki would
eventually step down. The violence got worse after it was realized that
President Mwai KIbaki would not budge as he alleged that he was the
“legitimate” Kenyan President. Similarly, individuals attacked supporters of
rival political parties whom they perceived as enemies.
Population
density
Inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya is mainly
attributed to population density. With many individuals migrating from their
native regions in search of greener pastures, it isn’t a wonder to find silent
conflicts emerging due to competition for scarce resources. The election fraud
was thus seen as an opportunity by some to drive out those they perceived as
intruders from their land.
Corruption
According to the survey by Transparency
International, most Kenyans believed that the country’s next elections set for
March 2013 would be marred by violence if corruption concerns were not
addressed (www.vo anews.com/english/news/a-13-2…). Corruption was rampant
during the 2007/2008 post-election violence whereby voters were paid to vote
more than twice. Security personnel were also given “tokens” so that they would
not interfere and simply assume the violence.
Inter-ethnic
rivalry
Kenya has had a history of inter-ethnic
rivalry among its different ethnic groups. This is mainly due to ethnocentrism
where one ethnic group views themselves as being superior compared to others.
This fact largely contributed to the post-election violence as the tribes that
viewed themselves as being superior attacked those they perceived as inferior,
killing and displacing them. The attacks on ‘minority’ ethnic groups was
further fuelled by the desire of ethnic groups to remove “foreigners” who had
found permanent residence in their midst.
Hate
speech and incitements
The 2007/2008 post-election violence was
characterized by hate speech and incitement to violence both from politicians
and propaganda sources. Individuals manifested hate speech on vernacular radio stations
whereby they out rightly belittled members of rival communities. There were
also reports of the circulation of malicious cell phone text messages that
propagated hate speech and alarming rumours. This fact was not taken kindly by
some and members of the communities targeted by the hate speech responded by
attacking those they perceived as enemies; killing and evicting them.
For example, the Orange Democratic Movement
planned protests, intended to last for three days; from 16-19 January 2008.
They even went ahead and called for more protests on 24 January 2008.
Unemployment
among the youth
Kenya is characterized by massive youth
unemployment. It is estimated that around two million youth are unemployed and
that most youth have no hopes of formal employment
(www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf). This fact was used by some
individuals to their advantage as they recruited gangs of youths who were
willing to earn a buck so as to carry out destructions, evictions and killings.
It could be argued that some youth joined the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)
due to idleness and not out of their free will.
Competition
for land
During colonization, white settlers had
taken fertile parts of land in the Rift Valley province and in western Kenya.
After independence, it is alleged that President Jomo Kenyatta let members of
his Kikuyu tribe buy the land at favorable conditions, instead of returning it
to the communities from which it was taken (www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-violence.html).
This move created resentment between the native tribes of Rift Valley province
and Western Kenya and the Kikuyu who allegedly bought the land.
The post election violence was thus ceased as an
opportunity more so by native communities of Rift Valley province to drive out
intruders from their land and thus pave way for them to reclaim ‘what was
rightfully theirs.’
Role of
the media in the post election violence
It is alleged that the media had a role
in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Some vernacular FM stations
contributed to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity and incited violence.
These included vernacular music and negative ethnicity allegedly coming from
Kikuyu FM stations such as Kameme, Inooro, Coro and the popular Kalenjin Kass
FMamong others. (The Kreigler report; (www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf)
The cutting off and later ban of live
broadcast of the 2007 election vote tallying inflamed tension bringing the
country to the brink. This move aggravated individuals as they thought that
this move was aimed at further rigging of elections. The live and extensive
coverage of the post election violence could also have fuelled the violence as
some individuals viewed this as an avenue for recognition and thus aimed at
being recognized by the world.
TOWARDS
A PEACEFUL GENERAL ELECTION
The history of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan and Burundi where war still ranges
despite the presence of the United Nations (UN) peace keepers, should be an eye
opener for Kenyans to be actively involved in putting up and implementing
measures that will keep violence at bay not only in 2013 but also in future
elections. Immediate action will prevent a scenario where it may be impossible
to contain and/or control a worse occurrence in Kenya where killings could
occur on a larger scale.
The Nairobi Star on 12 August 2011 reported that majority of Kenyans
believed that the next general election would be free from violence. The Brand
Kenya perception survey report released on 11 August 2011 by Brand Kenya Board
indicates that 79 percent of Kenyans believed that the next general elections would
be free from violence. Mary Kimonye Brand Kenya CEO stated thus: "This is due to a perception that Kenyans
have learnt from what happened in 2007/2008 post-election violence."
In as
much as this survey gives hope to Kenyans, it shouldn’t be taken to mean that
the instance of post-election violence in 2013 should be overlooked as the
survey targeted only a portion of Kenyans. Besides, there is still the 11
percent who believe that violence was still probable after the next general
elections. This should thus be an eye opener for the Kenyan government to come
up with strategies aimed at ensuring a peaceful 2013. Some recommendations that
will ensure that the 2007/2008 scenario is a thing of the past include:
Implementing
the recommendations in the Kreigler and Waki Reports
On 4 March, 2008, the parties
to the Kenyan dialogue and reconciliation meeting under the chairmanship of
Kofi Annan agreed to form two non-judicial commissions – the Independent Review
Commission (IREC) and the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence
(CIPEV). The Independent Review
Commission (IREC) also known as the Kreigler Report was to investigate all
aspects of the 2007 elections and make recommendations that would improve the
electoral process. On the other hand, the Commission of Inquiry on Post
Election Violence (CIPEV) would investigate the facts and surrounding
circumstances that followed the elections and make recommendations to prevent
any recurrence of the violence in future.
The Kreigler report
specifically examined the integrity of the whole electoral process, from voter
registration to nomination of presidential candidates, the role of political
parties, observers, the media, civil society and the public at large in the
2007 elections and came up with a number of recommendations. They include:
institutionalizing the practice of post-election audits and evaluations (the
audits are to be conducted by an independent auditor and made public),
establishment of an electoral dispute resolution court, development of
procedures for safe storage of election materials until the completion of
post-election analysis and storage of election results in electronic format.
The Commission of Inquiry on
Post Election Violence (CIPEV), popularly known as the Waki report made a
number of recommendations to prevent future recurrence of post-election
violence. They include; prosecuting the perpetrators of the 2007/2008
post-election violence which was to be done through the establishment of a
Special Tribunal, police reforms, establishing an independent Complaints
Directorate and fully utilizing the Witness Protection Act 2008 among other
recommendations.
The implementation of
recommendations in the Waki and Kreigler Reports will in essence prevent a
repeat of violence in future.
Electronic
voter registration and election result storage
Electoral fraud was mainly attributed to
manual voter registration whereby some voters registered and even voted more
than once in a bid to give their preferred candidates an advantage over their
opponents.
There existed cases whereby the election
results indicated that the numbers presented were more than the registered
voters in some constituencies. A repeat of such a scenario could be prevented
if voters were registered electronically rather than manually and if election
results were also stored electronically. This would reduce instances of ‘human
error’ and ‘loss of election results’ and thus ensure accuracy since once an
individual is registered, they cannot be re-registered. Similarly, election
results could be sent electronically to the concerned persons once they are
out. Electronic voter registration was introduced during the referendum in 2010
and it has proved to be successful.
Use of
social institutions
Social institutions play an important
role in individuals’ lives. This is due to the fact that they are responsible
for socialization of individuals and for the way individuals perceive matters.
Social institutions such as the church and schools can be used to propagate
peaceful messages to Kenyans.
The government through the ministry of
Education could for example introduce a curriculum on peace at primary and
secondary school level since the youth constitute the majority of Kenyans and
would be instrumental in passing on peace messages to fellow Kenyans. Moreover,
it was the youth who were actively involved in the 2007/2008 post-election
violence. The clergy could also be used in spreading peace messages since they
represent morality and are viewed as God’s representatives on earth.
Outlawing
tribal affiliations
Tribalism is rampant in Kenya and a threat to
national unity. Tribalism was the major contributing factor of the 2007/2008
post-election violence as individuals attacked members of minority tribes in
their regions. For instance, communities in the Rift Valley targeted non-Kalenjin communities while gangs of Kikuyu youths subsequently attacked non-Kikuyu groups in Naivasha, Nakuru
and Mathare (www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-violence.html).
The Kenyan parliament should pass a Bill that outlaws tribal
affiliations in political parties. Political parties must in fact have
representation from all ethnic communities to be declared legal as this will in
effect reduce instances of their resentment in particular regions.
Judicial
reforms
The Kreigler report noted some weaknesses
in the Kenyan legal system. The major weaknesses identified include: the right
to vote and stand for elections is not expressly provided for in the law. There
are also too many laws relating to elections, the process of law enforcement is
also cumbersome and provides a leeway for scapegoats.
The independent Review Commission (IREC)
recommended that the right to vote and be elected be included in the Bill of
Rights. Similarly, corrupt judicial officers should be released as they are a
contributing factor in the delay of justice administration. Laws relating to
operational management of election should also be consolidated under one
statute.
Implementing
the National Accord
The National Accord is an Act of
Parliament to give effect to the agreement on the principles of partnership of
the Coalition Government, to foster national accord and reconciliation, to
provide for the formation of a coalition Government and the establishment of
offices of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers of the
Government of Kenya, their functions and various matters connected with the
incident of the foregoing (The National Accord and Reconciliation Bill, 2008).
The National Accord outlines ‘must dos’
through its agenda resolutions and gave timelines if the national healing and
reconstruction were to be realized. The ‘must dos’ included setting up of
commissions to investigate, examine and recommend circumstances that surrounded
the post-election violence and scrutinize the country’s election process with a
view of initiating electoral reforms so as to avoid future election chaos
(Kreigler and Waki Reports on 2007 Elections).
The National Accord is a Bill that should
be enacted as it will ensure that future instances of election violence do not
recur.
Police
reforms
The Independent Review
Commission (IREC) in their report cited evidence they were given to implicate
the police force as a contributing factor of the 2007/2008 post-election
violence. It is alleged that the police were bribed so that they could play a
passive role in the post-election violence. In many cases, police officers
deliberately refused to intervene in the post-election violence and their enforcement
of the law was unbalanced and unethical this in essence resulted in more deaths
that could have been prevented.
The Independent Review
Commission (IREC) recommended a comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police
Service and the Administration Police. The reforms should involve a complete
audit of the current police management, structures policies, practices and
procedures; and a complete revision of the Police Act. Corrupt police officers
should also be released from their duties. The government should also explore
international capacity building possibilities for policing in general with
specific focus on criminal investigations.
Civil
Education and peace campaigns
This can be done through intensifying
drives to educate citizens and raise public awareness on election violence;
providing election guidelines to business leaders, the community and Civil
Society Organizations and setting up a query desk in all constituencies where
individuals can have their queries addressed.( www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php)
Similarly, peace campaigns should be
intensified as this will ensure that individuals associate the 2013 general
elections with peace. For instance, instead of always airing advertisements
advocating for condom use, peace campaigns should instead be adopted.
The Role of the Constitution
Article
81 of the Kenyan constitution promulgated on 27th August 2010
provides general principles for the electoral system. It clearly states in
Article 81(e) that there should be free and fair elections, which are:-
i)
By
secret ballot;
ii)
Free
from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption;
iii)
Conducted
by an independent body;
iv) Transparent; and
v)
Administered
in an impartial, neutral, efficient, accurate and accountable.
Fully implementing the constitution will
fundamentally improve the quality and criteria of leadership and integrity and
in essence keep election violence at bay.
The Role of the
International Criminal Court (ICC)
The International Criminal Court had to step in
to administer justice to Kenya and in essence give victims the hope that
justice can still be attained for those who incurred losses. This move will in
essence prevent future cases of post-election violence as any individuals with
an aim of ever propagating future violence will think twice before doing so.
Similarly the prosecution of the perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election
violence will end the cycle of overlooking crimes more so, those against humanity
in Kenya.
The National Cohesion and
Integration Commission
The National
Cohesion and Integration Commission should be used to prevent political
leaders from inciting individuals against each other as was the case during the
2007/2008 post-election. Although the National Integration Commission has been labouring to play such a role in a difficult
political environment, it is necessary for the commission to improve in this
area ahead of the 2013 general elections.
Moreover,
the commission needs to identify and reveal to the government and other
stakeholders important issues that need to be tackled for a peaceful 2013 as it
did when it brought out the issue of ethnic disparities in the civil service.
The government should also note that the issues addressed by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission
need to addressed as they essentially point towards maintaining peace in 2013.
CONCLUSION
The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed
presidential elections brought up deep seated and long standing divisions
within the Kenyan society. If left unaddressed, these divisions threaten the
existence of Kenya as a unified country (The National Accord and Reconciliation
Bill, 2008). The task of ensuring that the country remains unified has been
delegated to the Kenyan leaders.
Even though the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has had an active role in ‘cleaning house,’ the ultimate
responsibility mopping up and polishing Kenya’s social, economic and political
landscape must be effectively done by Kenyans, not by groups of 'Eminent
Persons’ (www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php).Kenyans need to realize the fact that Kenya is their homeland and anything that would affect the peace and stability of the country would in essence affect them. They should thus be involved in ensuring that the country is free from any potential harm. Secondly, pro-activity is required of the Private Sector, since it is critical in reducing the likelihood of violence during the election process. In addition, there is need for international and domestic election observation; political party engagement; civil society activism and network building; Media responsibility; adequate security during election and restrain of the business community from funding candidates, political parties/organizations and commercialization of politics. These strategies if applied will ensure that post-election violence in Kenya becomes a thing of the past.
Prosecution of perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election violence would be a lesson for other individuals in power to think twice before intending to finance or incite individuals to engage in violence. Similarly, any person charged with post-election violence offences of any nature should be barred from holding public office or contesting for any electoral position. Breaking the cycle of impunity will fundamentally pave way to peaceful elections in future.
Just as Kenyans made a decision to save fellow Kenyans from hunger, they must similarly make a decision of redeeming our lovely nation from the claws of impunity.
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